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ABSTRACT 
 
Two of the most recognizable competitors in this new 
era of Euro-American competition are Airbus and Boeing.  
These two competitors are the world’s leading aircraft 
manufacturers and their competition is shaping the face of 
the commercial aviation industry.  The competition between 
these two companies is for the “World’s Leading Commercial 
Airline Manufacturer.”  This title is currently held by 
Airbus who has lead yearly production and taken more orders 
over the past three years.  
Boeing has fallen behind in being the technological 
leader due to a falling budget, poor industrial model, and 
ethical practices.  As a result of losing ground to Airbus 
over the past few years, Boeing has been continuously 
restructuring itself in an effort to compete in this new 
era of competition.  By comparing these two companies the 
author’s objective was to determine a clear path forward 
for Boeing.      
To make this determination the author examined both 
companies while making a detailed analysis of certain 
areas.  Three focus areas were chosen based on initial 
analysis and the magnitude of their effects.  These focus 
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areas included subsidies, technology integration, and 
vision of the future.   
Airbus’ early successes can be attributed to an unfair 
subsidy advantage that is now at the center of this 
competition.  The next aspect at the center of this 
competition is their philosophies on automation and the 
implementation of technology.  Boeing and Airbus have 
different philosophies on the implementation of automation.  
While both philosophies are sound, there are advantages and 
disadvantages to each.   
Finally, each company in an attempt to gain an edge in 
the competition has staked its future on what each believes 
to be the future direction of commercial aviation.  Airbus 
has gone with the philosophy of the jumbo jet with the 
A380, whereas Boeing has opted for targeting the medium 
range market with the 787.   
The analysis of these two companies shows their 
difference in philosophies with regard to embracing new 
technologies in aircraft design and manufacturing.  This 
thesis examines how Airbus has risen as the “World Leading 
Commercial Aircraft Manufacturer” and Boeing’s need to 
self-optimize. 
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1 Introduction 
It was the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s 
that began the shaping of the world’s modern market.  In 
the present day world of economic competition there have 
risen two distinct sides, the United States and the 
European Union. 
     It is without a doubt these two competitors will shape 
the future of the world on all levels.  One of these levels 
is aviation. In line with the two global competitors there 
exist two major competing companies in the realm of 
commercial aviation, Boeing and Airbus.     
     In recent years Boeing has stumbled on both the 
military and commercial side of aviation thus needing to be 
revamped. (Sweeten, 1999)  Boeing has ceded its decades-
long dominance in the commercial aviation industry to 
Airbus.  Boeing, who lacked true competition for many 
years, fell to the fact that if not in competition with 
anyone then you must beat your last performance.    
In 2005, Airbus made more deliveries than Boeing for 
the third straight year and took more orders for aircraft 
for the fifth consecutive year asserting its position as 
the “World Leading Aircraft Manufacturer,” a title Boeing 
had held for many decades. (Griffiths, 2006)  Adding to 
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Boeing’s struggles was an ethics scandal at the top of the 
Boeing leadership.  The question is:  Can and will Boeing 
recover?  Airbus has surpassed Boeing because of its desire 
to beat Boeing, an aggressive approach to technology 
integration and an unfair subsidy advantage. 
This thesis discusses the history of both Airbus and 
Boeing, how Airbus succeeded at its goal of unseating 
Boeing as the “World’s Leading Aircraft Manufacturer” and 
the future implications that these competitors will bring 
in the airline industry.
  3
2 History of Airbus 
 
Airbus Industries began as a consortium of European 
aviation firms to compete with American companies such as 
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. In the 1960s European 
aircraft manufacturers competed with each other as much as 
with the American giants. In the mid-1960s tentative 
negotiations commenced regarding a European collaborative 
approach. 
Nationalism within each country, and barriers to trade 
imposed by neighboring countries, caused each of the 
European firms to be confined largely to its own domestic 
market. As a result, these firms were prevented from 
achieving adequate economies of scale. Also, no single 
European government's budget was large enough to provide 
its firms with the huge amounts of support through military 
research and development and other indirect subsidies 
enjoyed by U.S. firms. The European firms thus were unable 
to overcome the increasingly formidable barriers to entry.  
The European governments were justifiably concerned 
that competition from America's commercial aircraft 
manufacturers would eventually cause Europe's weak and 
divided industry to cease to exist, and that outcome was 
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unacceptable to them. By the late 1960s, Europe's political 
leaders began to focus on the only option they believed was 
available to them - pooling their resources and engaging in 
a cooperative effort to establish a European presence in 
the global jetliner industry. The European governments were 
highly motivated, and after much political wrangling they 
managed to put aside political differences and issues of 
national pride. 
In September 1967 the British, French and German 
governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to 
start developing the 300 seat Airbus A300. This was the 
second major joint aircraft program in Europe, following 
the Concorde, for which no ongoing consortium was devised. 
An earlier announcement had been made in July 1967 but had 
been complicated by the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). 
The British government refused to back its proposed 
competitor, a development of the BAC 1-11 and instead 
supported the Airbus aircraft. 
In the months following this agreement both the French 
and British governments expressed doubts about the 
aircraft. Another problem was the requirement for a new 
engine (to be developed by Rolls-Royce, the RB207). In 
December 1968 the French and British partner companies, Sud 
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Aviation and Hawker Siddeley, proposed a revised 
configuration, the 250 seat Airbus A250. Renamed the A300B 
the aircraft would not require new engines, reducing 
development costs. 
In 1969 the British government shocked its partners by 
withdrawing from the project. Given the participation by 
Hawker Siddeley up to that point, France and Germany were 
reluctant to take over the wing design and thus the British 
company was allowed to continue as a major subcontractor. 
In 1978 Britain rejoined the consortium when British 
Aerospace (the merged Hawker Siddeley and BAC) purchased a 
20% share of the company. (Hayward, 1987) 
The Airbus A300 was the first aircraft model launched 
by Airbus. Airbus Industries was formally set up in 1970 
following an agreement between Sud-Aviation (France) and 
Deutsche Airbus—itself a German aerospace consortium 
consisting of Bölkow, Dornier, Flugzeug-Union Süd, HFB, 
Messerschmitt, TG Siebelwerke, and VFW. The grouping was 
joined by CASA of Spain in 1971. Each company would deliver 
its sections as fully equipped, ready to fly items, a 
precursor to “Lean” manufacturing. “Lean” manufacturing is 
a management philosophy focused on reducing waste by 
eliminating overproduction, waiting time, defective 
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products, and processing thus increasing quality and 
efficiency while reducing cost.  The name "Airbus" was 
taken from a non-proprietary term used by the airline 
industry in the 1960s to refer to a commercial aircraft of 
a certain size and range, for this term was acceptable to 
the French linguistically.  
In 1972 the A300 made its maiden flight and the first 
production model, the A300B2 entered service in 1974. 
Initially the success of the consortium was poor but by 
1979 there were 81 aircraft in service. It was the launch 
of the A320 in 1981 that guaranteed Airbus as a major 
player in the aircraft market - the aircraft had over 400 
orders before it first flew, compared to 15 for the A300 in 
1972. (Brander, 1983) 
The A320 was the first all-new design in its category 
in 30 years.  The aircraft provided better operating 
efficiency, better performance and greater passenger 
comfort.  It was the first commercial aircraft to feature 
“fly-by-wire” flight controls and side sticks.  It set the 
standard for all subsequent Airbus cockpits.  With the 
A320, Airbus started its philosophy of a two-man crew, 
pilot and co-pilot with no engineer. 
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The use of “fly-by-wire” gave Airbus the ability to 
follow another philosophy of creating families of aircraft 
sharing the same cockpit layout and the same flight 
handling characteristics.  This philosophy has helped 
reduce the amount of training required by airline pilots 
and has proved an advantage as Airbus began development of 
its long range aircraft.  Airbus entered the long range 
markets with the A330 and A340 to challenge U.S. makers in 
the intercontinental travel and medium range markets.  
These platforms, having similar cockpits and handling 
qualities to their predecessors, have been popular among 
carriers.  Of note, Airbus sees the existing A330 as the 
answer to the market for which Boeing is developing the 
787. 
Until recently, airbus was still a fairly loose 
alliance but that changed shortly after major defense 
mergers in 2000. DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (successor to 
Deutsche Airbus), Aérospatiale (successor to Sud-Aviation) 
and CASA merged to form EADS. In 2001 BAE Systems (formerly 
British Aerospace) and EADS formed the Airbus Integrated 
Company to coincide with the development of the new Airbus 
A380 which will seat 555 passengers and be the world's 
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largest commercial passenger jet when it enters service in 
2007, again taking another title from Boeing. 
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3 History of Boeing 
The company was incorporated in Seattle, Washington by 
William E. Boeing on July 15, 1916, as “Pacific Aero 
Products Co.” following the June 15, 1916 maiden flight of 
one of the two “B&W” seaplanes built with the assistance of 
George Conrad Westervelt, a U.S. Navy engineer. On May 9, 
1917, the company became the “Boeing Airplane Company.” 
William E. Boeing had studied at Yale University and worked 
initially in the timber industry, where he became a rich 
man and acquired knowledge about wooden structures. This 
knowledge would prove invaluable in his subsequent design 
and assembly of airplanes. 
In 1927, Boeing created an airline, named Boeing Air 
Transport (BAT). A year later, BAT, as well as Pacific Air 
Transport and Boeing Airplane Company merged into a single 
corporation. The company changed its name to United 
Aircraft And Transport Corporation in 1929 and acquired 
Pratt & Whitney, Hamilton Standard Propeller Company, and 
Chance Vought. United Aircraft then purchased National Air 
Transport in 1930. The Air Mail Act of 1934 prohibited 
airlines and manufacturers from being under the same 
corporate umbrella, so the company split into three smaller 
companies - Boeing Airplane Company, United Airlines, and 
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United Aircraft Corporation, the precursor to United 
Technologies. As a result, William Boeing sold off his 
shares. 
Shortly thereafter, an agreement with Pan American 
World Airways (Pan Am) was reached to develop and build a 
commercial flying-boat able to carry passengers on 
transoceanic routes. The first flight of the Boeing 314 
Clipper was in June 1938. It was the largest civil aircraft 
of its time, with a capacity of 90 passengers on day 
flights, and of 40 passengers on night flights. One year 
later, the first regular passenger service from the U.S. to 
the United Kingdom was inaugurated. Subsequently, other 
routes were opened so that soon Pan Am flew with the Boeing 
314 to destinations all over the world.  
In 1938, Boeing completed work on the Model 307 
Stratoliner. This was the world’s first pressurized-cabin 
transport aircraft, and it was capable of cruising at an 
altitude of 20,000 feet which gave it the capability of 
cruising above most weather disturbances. (Krugman 1986) 
During World War II, Boeing built a huge number of 
bombers. In the beginning of March 1944, production had 
been scaled up in such a manner, that over 350 aircraft 
were built each month. During these years of war, the 
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leading aircraft companies of the U.S. had to cooperate. 
The Boeing-designed B-17 bomber was assembled also by 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and Douglas Aircraft Co., while the 
Boeing B-29 was assembled also by Bell Aircraft Co. and by 
Glenn L. Martin Company. 
After the war, most orders of bombers were canceled 
and 70,000 people lost their jobs at Boeing. The company 
aimed to recover quickly by selling its Stratocruiser, a 
luxurious four-engine commercial airliner developed from 
the B-29. However, sales of this model were not as expected 
and Boeing had to seek other opportunities to overcome the 
situation. The company successfully sold military aircraft 
adapted for troop transportation and for aerial refueling. 
(Leary, 1995) 
In the mid-1950s technology had advanced 
significantly, which gave Boeing the possibility to develop 
and manufacture totally new products. In 1958, Boeing began 
delivery of its 707, the United States' first commercial 
jet airliner, in response to the British De Havilland 
Comet, French Sud Aviation Caravelle and Soviet Tupolev Tu-
104 'Camel'; which were the world’s first generation of 
commercial jet aircraft. With the successful sale of the 
707, a four-engine, 156-passenger airliner, the U.S. became 
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a world leader in the commercial jet market. A few years 
later, Boeing added a second version of this aircraft, the 
720 which was slightly faster and had a shorter range. This 
was followed by the introduction of the 727, another 
commercial jet airliner of similar size, which had three 
engines and was designed for medium-range routes. The 727 
was immediately well accepted as a comfortable and reliable 
aircraft by passengers, crews, and airlines. Although 
production was discontinued in 1984, at the turn of the 
millennium nearly 1,300 727s were still in service at 
airlines around the world. 
In 1967, Boeing introduced another short- and medium-
range airliner, the twin-engine 737. It has since become 
the best-selling commercial jet aircraft in aviation 
history. The 737 is still being produced, and continuous 
improvements are still being made. Several versions have 
been developed, mainly to increase seating capacity and 
range. 
The roll-out ceremonies for the first 747-100, Boeing 
next big step, took place in 1968 at the massive new 
factory in Everett, WA about an hour's drive from Boeing's 
Seattle home. The aircraft made its first flight a year 
later. The 747 had an intercontinental range and a larger 
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seating capacity than Boeing's previous aircraft.  In 
January 1970 the first 747, a four-engine long-range 
airliner, flew its first commercial flight. This famous 
aircraft completely changed the way of flying, with its 
450-passenger seating capacity and its upper deck. 
Until recently, Boeing had been the only aircraft 
manufacturer to offer such an airliner and has delivered 
near to 1,400 units. Now, Airbus will offer the A380, which 
when delivered will be the largest operational airliner. To 
keep up; as with most of Boeing’s aircraft, the 747 has 
undergone continuous improvements to keep it 
technologically up-to-date. Larger versions have also been 
developed by stretching the upper deck. 
Looking back at the 1970s, there was a heavy recession 
in the airlines industry so Boeing did not receive one 
single order for more than one year. Boeing’s bet for the 
future, the new 747 was delayed in production and 
engendered much higher costs than had been forecast. 
Another problem was in 1971 the U.S. Congress decided to 
stop the financial support for the development of the 
supersonic 2707, Boeing’s answer to the British-French 
Concorde, forcing the company to discontinue the project. 
The company had to reduce the number of employees from over 
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80,000 to almost half, in the Seattle area.  However, the 
707 and 747 formed the backbone of many major airline 
fleets through the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
In 1983, the economic situation began to improve. 
Boeing assembled its 1,000th 737 passenger airliner. During 
the following years, commercial aircraft and their military 
versions became the basic equipment of airlines and air 
forces. As passenger air traffic increased, competition was 
harder, mainly from a European newcomer in commercial 
airliner manufacturing, Airbus. Boeing had to offer new 
aircraft, and developed the single-aisle 757, the larger, 
twin-aisle 767, and upgraded versions of the 737 to compete 
with its growing competitor.  
In April 1994, Boeing introduced its most modern 
commercial jet aircraft, the twin-engine 777, in between 
the 767 and the 747, with a seating capacity of between 300 
and 400 passengers in a standard three class layout. The 
longest range twin-engine aircraft in the world, the 777 
was the first Boeing airliner to feature a "fly-by-wire" 
system and was conceived in response to the inroads being 
made by Airbus into Boeing’s traditional market. This 
aircraft, commonly known as the “Triple Seven,” reached an 
important milestone by being the first airliner to be 
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designed entirely by using CAD techniques. Also in the mid-
1990s, the company developed the revamped version of the 
737, known as the “Next-Generation 737,” or 737NG. It has 
since become the fastest-selling version of the 737 in 
history, and on April 20, 2006 sales passed those of the 
'Classic 737,' with a follow-up order for 79 aircraft from 
Southwest Airlines. The “Next-Generation 737” line includes 
the 737-600, the 737-700, the 737-800, and the 737-900. 
(Matlack 2004) 
In 1996, Boeing acquired Rockwell’s aerospace and 
defense units. The Rockwell products became a subsidiary of 
Boeing, named Boeing North American, Inc. One year later, 
Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas. Following the merger 
between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the McDonnell Douglas 
MD-95 was renamed the 717-200, and the production of the 
MD-11 was later stopped. Boeing introduced a new corporate 
identity with completion of the merger, incorporating the 
Boeing logotype and a stylized version of the McDonnell 
Douglas symbol, which was derived from the Douglas Aircraft 
logo from the 1950s. (Rogers, 1996) 
In recent years Boeing has faced an increasingly 
competitive Airbus, which offers some commonality between 
models (reducing maintenance and training costs) and the 
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latest fly-by-wire technology. From the 1970s Airbus has 
increased its family of aircraft to the point where they 
can now offer an aircraft in almost every class Boeing 
does. Indeed, Airbus is now competing in markets that 
Boeing once had a monopoly over, e.g., the A320 has been 
selected by several low-cost operators.  The aircraft used 
by these airlines has traditionally been the 737.  The 747 
has suffered by competing with Boeing’s 777-300 series.  
Currently, Boeing is planning to introduce a new 
aircraft; the 787 “Dreamliner”, and four new aircraft 
variants; the ultra-long-range 777-200LR, the 737-900ER, 
737-700ER and the 747-8. The 787 was originally known by 
the developmental designator 7E7. The Boeing 777-200LR has 
the longest range of any commercial aircraft, and is the 
first airliner to able to fly halfway across the planet 
with a commercially viable payload, and holds the world 
record for the longest flight by a commercial airliner at 
21,601km. (Donnelly, 2003) 
After several decades of numerous successes, Boeing 
lost ground to Europe’s Airbus and subsequently lost its 
position as market leader in 2003. Multiple Boeing projects 
were pursued and then cancelled including the Boeing Sonic. 
The Boeing Sonic Cruiser was launched in 2001 along with a 
  17
new advertising campaign to promote its new motto, “Forever 
New Frontiers”, and rehabilitate its image. Boeing is now 
focused on the newly-launched 787 as a platform of total 
fleet rejuvenation, which has benefited from strong sales 
success at the expense of Airbus' competing offerings. 
As an aside, on October 10, 2001, against fierce 
competition for the contract to the Joint Strike Fighter, 
Boeing lost to rival Lockheed Martin in the multi-billion 
dollar contract. Boeing’s aircraft was the X-32, which lost 
out to Lockheed’s F-35 entrant. The X-32 may have been 
hampered by the requirement for a redesign after several 
flaws were found in the original concept. 
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4 Defining the Issue of Subsidies 
Since the average effective life of a commercial 
aircraft is twenty-five years, within the next fifteen 
years virtually every airplane in the world's commercial 
aircraft fleet will have been manufactured by either Boeing 
or Airbus.  
Boeing has long been the leader in the world aviation 
industry. Having survived the turbulent formative years of 
the industry, Boeing's first success in the commercial 
market, the 707, was the result of the use of military 
technology gained from Boeing’s military aircraft 
development.  This was a common theme seen throughout 
Boeing’s history and rise to glory.  
Airbus has followed a very different path to 
prominence. In many ways it is a highly improbable 
enterprise, having started from scratch as the result of a 
cooperative effort among notoriously nationalistic and 
independent European governments. When Airbus was created 
in 1970, there was much skepticism as to whether Airbus 
could succeed (Thornton, 1995).  However, massive 
government subsidies to Airbus enabled it to become a major 
competitor, and it is now posing a strong challenge to 
Boeing's dominance.  
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Airbus slowly but steadily expanded its market share 
during the first two decades of its existence, reaching 
it’s self-determined "survival threshold" of 30 percent of 
new orders in the early 1990s. Its successes during this 
period came largely at the expense of a rapidly fading 
Lockheed and a more tenacious but slowly slipping McDonnell 
Douglas. Lockheed suspended jetliner production in 1981, 
and, at the time of its merger with Boeing, McDonnell 
Douglas held only a 4 percent share of new aircraft orders. 
The loss of market share by these manufacturers was almost 
exactly matched by gains for Airbus, while Boeing 
consistently maintained its accustomed market share of 60 
percent or more. With the other competitors out of the 
picture, the battle for market share is being waged 
directly between Boeing and Airbus. Airbus's continued 
growth in market share in recent years has come directly at 
Boeing's expense. Boeing's share of new orders in 1998 has 
slipped to 54 percent, going towards the increasing 
percentage of Airbus. 
The remarkable success of Airbus is a testimony to the 
theory of strategic trade policy and use of modern 
technology as it becomes available. According to this 
theory, comparative advantage can be created through 
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subsidies and other forms of protection from competition 
granted to favored industries, or "national champions," 
that likely would not prosper in a competitive market. This 
notion of managed trade is in stark contrast to the free-
market orientation that is generally pursued by U.S. firms 
and endorsed by U.S. policymakers.  
During the 1920s and 1930s, there were many aircraft 
producers throughout Europe and the United States, but all 
were small, most were poorly financed, and none were 
dominant. Market demand was limited, and individual 
aircraft were generally produced one by one rather than as 
part of an assembly-line process. This situation changed 
dramatically during World War II, as aircraft were mass-
produced in large numbers for the military; and the pace of 
technological advance accelerated. In the years immediately 
after the war ended, U.S. and European manufacturers 
attempted to capitalize on these developments by applying 
what they had learned to the production of commercial 
aircraft. European firms were especially aggressive in 
applying jet-engine technology to commercial aircraft, and 
in the 1950s they produced the world's first commercial 
jetliners.  
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American manufacturers were slower to adopt the new 
jet-engine technology, but they learned from European 
mistakes, and their more measured approach proved quite 
successful. The fact that the United States was the 
dominant military and economic power of the free world both 
facilitated and necessitated the accelerating rate of 
growth in the U.S. industry in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
need for larger and faster military aircraft with extended 
range resulted in huge expenditures by the U.S. military 
for research and development. Naturally; the private 
companies that produced these military aircraft enjoyed 
significant spillover benefits for the production of 
commercial aircraft. The government provided additional 
indirect support through funding for the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and support of 
higher education, which produced large numbers of well-
educated engineers, metallurgists, and other technically 
trained college graduates; and regulation of the domestic 
airline industry, which provided a stable market for 
commercial jetliners. In addition, rising income and output 
levels in the United States, along with the large 
geographic size of the country, created a growing demand 
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for efficient air transport, further fostering the 
development of more and better aircraft.  
While demand was growing steadily, the production side 
of the industry was undergoing important structural 
changes. The industry gradually evolved into one 
characterized by large economies of scale, steep learning 
curves, enormous expenditures for research and development, 
high costs overall. A high level of dependence on 
technology staying power became essential, since it might 
require ten years or more and billions of dollars to take a 
new jetliner from conception to test flight. Once testing 
is complete and production of a particular model is under 
way, per-unit costs can be brought down to manageable 
levels as the huge development costs are spread more 
widely, and production efficiency increases because of 
learning-curve effects. The increasing sophistication of 
aircrafts has made the break-even point drift upward and to 
the right. The current rule of thumb in the industry is 
that at least 600 units are required to attain the break-
even level of production for a particular model.  
As the cost structure in the commercial jetliner 
industry became more problematic, and as the demand for 
jetliners became increasingly cyclical, the number of firms 
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producing such aircraft gradually declined, mostly as a 
result of merger and consolidation. By the 1970s, only 
three U.S. firms remained, and those three dominated the 
worldwide market. But three was still too many, as stated 
previously, which resulted in Boeings rise to dominance.  
The changing nature of the commercial aircraft 
industry during the postwar years resulted in mergers and 
consolidations among European producers as well. In spite 
of these consolidations, the European firms could not 
individually establish an effective presence in the 
industry.  The success of Airbus, with its business model 
of heavy government subsidization without recoupment of 
costs, posed a particular threat to U.S. airplane 
manufacturers. Moreover, it created a general threat to a 
U.S. economy, then in the midst of mild recession.  
Airbus, founded in 1969 by state-run aerospace 
companies in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom was 
heavily funded by these governments. Among its advantages 
was a harmonious aviation industry established by the 
United Kingdom and France while creating Concorde. Though 
its initial market share was small, Airbus quickly grew 
with the help of heavy development subsidization. In 
addition, with center-left governments in power in European 
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countries throughout the 1970s, possible nationalistic 
implications for Airbus' success could be seen. While 
Boeing was a privately established and financed company, 
albeit one with significant involvement with United States 
defense contracts, Europe's aerospace corporations were 
government creations, and from the beginning of the jet age 
were entirely government financed and supported. When 
Airbus was created in the late 1960s, the Concorde was 
still under production by European governments despite 
staggering costs. Boeing, meanwhile, was nearly bankrupted 
by its development of the original jumbo, the 747. Boeing 
was forced to lay off thousands of workers and to provide 
private sector airlines with favorable purchase terms in 
order to both secure much needed deposits and establish the 
order base to spur further development and production. 
Eventually, the U.S. government did provide minimal 
assistance, mostly in the form of encouraging negotiations 
between Boeing and major airline customers; it provided 
essentially nothing in the way of direct financial support 
for the 747. In contrast to U.S. manufacturers, Europe's 
civil aircraft development was almost entirely government 
funded. 
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The Boeing 747 has been the premier jet for long-haul 
international travel since its introduction in the late 
1960s. Updated models of the 747 are still in production, 
and it remains a backbone of Boeing's line. While Airbus 
has introduced several jets designed to compete with 
smaller Boeing products, until recently it has not 
attempted to directly compete with the 747-the world's 
largest, most expensive and most profitable commercial 
aircraft.  
It was at the Paris Air Show in 1991, riding high 
after driving Boeing's market share below fifty percent, 
Airbus announced that it would begin preliminary 
development of a passenger airplane with a capacity of up 
to 700--the largest in history. Despite this announcement, 
after the signing of the 1992 Bilateral Agreement, Airbus 
announced that it would abandon its solo effort and entered 
into discussions with Boeing for joint development of the 
super-jumbo. With potential development costs estimated at 
up to $15 billion, a joint project was believed to be the 
only way Airbus could develop a new airplane and stay 
within the boundaries of the subsidy agreement. Boeing and 
Airbus agreed to a one-year feasibility study of the 
project, which took place in 1993. (Jenny, 1993) 
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Though the initial cooperation went beyond the 
feasibility study, the companies eventually decided not to 
proceed with the joint project. Even during periods of 
putative cooperation, the two companies pursued different 
tracks, perhaps in preparation for the eventual need to 
proceed on their own. The cooperation ended in 1995, with 
each side claiming that the market would not bear the 
introduction of such a large airplane. Airbus then 
proceeded to develop just such an airplane independently.  
Airbus continued to proceed with its plans and 
development, albeit in a low profile manner, despite the 
breakdown of cooperation with Boeing, and negative reports 
by aviation analysts. From 1997 to 2000, the company 
continued to talk to potential partners and customers about 
the need for a super-jumbo, and became convinced that its 
future depended on having its own top of the line super-
jumbo. It appears that Airbus' decision to develop the 
super-jumbo was not strictly a business decision, but was 
also motivated, at least in part, by strategic 
considerations. Airbus announced tentative plans to proceed 
with the A380 in mid-2000, contingent upon receiving forty 
to fifty orders from airline customers. The orders were 
received, and in December 2000 Airbus officially announced 
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the launch of the 500 to 900 seat A380, to be delivered 
sometime around 2006.  
The reaction of Boeing and the U.S. government was 
swift and predictable. Both parties claimed that, despite 
the conversion of Airbus from a French holding company to a 
joint stock company in mid-2000, the program was unfairly 
and perhaps illegally subsidized by European governments, 
and that Airbus' actions could start a trade war. Boeing 
claimed that it had not proceeded with its plans for a 
super-jumbo because of the potentially prohibitive cost, 
and that for Airbus to develop such an airplane with the 
backing of European governments would be a violation of 
world trade conventions. Airbus responded that everything 
it was doing was within the letter of the agreements signed 
by the European Union and United States, and that it would 
proceed as planned.  
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5 The Trade Agreement 
 
From the first days of its existence, Airbus was the 
beneficiary of direct subsidies in the form of government 
loans for aircraft development. These loans, amounting to 
between 70 and 90 percent of an aircraft's development 
cost, carried below-market interest rates. Rather than 
repaying the loans according to a prescribed timetable, as 
typically would occur in a competitive market, the Airbus 
firms repaid the loans from revenue received as new 
aircraft were delivered. Moreover, debt forgiveness was 
commonplace, a practice that would not likely occur in a 
competitive market.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. trade officials 
and aircraft manufacturers protested that these subsidies 
violated international trade agreements and gave Airbus 
unfair competitive advantages. The United States asserted 
that the subsidies allowed Airbus to price its jetliners at 
10 percent or more below cost (Fortiman 1989). Perhaps the 
more important point is that Airbus would probably never 
even have gotten off the ground without this substantial 
government support. In short, U.S. officials maintained 
that Europe's treatment of Airbus was tantamount to an 
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industrial policy of subsidizing Airbus to ensure its 
competitiveness. In the process a European comparative 
advantage in the jetliner industry was artificially 
created.  
The European governments were unyielding in the face 
of these protests, since they were strongly motivated to 
ensure the development of a viable commercial aircraft 
industry. They thought that this industry would complement 
the growth of the entire European aerospace industry and 
would thus be expected to yield social and economic 
benefits that exceed the cost of the subsidies. Commercial 
aircraft would occupy a pivotal position in international 
trade, be an important creator of wealth and employment, 
and contribute greatly to both national prestige and 
national defense. Research and development in commercial- 
aircraft manufacturing would also produce technological 
spillovers for other key industries. In addition, the 
United States would be prevented from holding a worldwide 
monopoly in production of commercial aircraft.  
Subsidies were needed to provide Airbus with some 
breathing space until it could stand on its own, but both 
Airbus and the governments realized that large direct 
subsidies could not continue indefinitely. The critical 
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goal for Airbus was to capture at least 30 percent of new 
orders. Airbus officials thought that after that milestone 
had been reached, the enterprise could continue on a more 
self-sustaining basis and depend less heavily on direct 
government support. In the interim, government subsidies 
allowed Airbus the luxury of not having to base its 
decisions to launch new models solely on expected profits 
or losses (Cravens 1992).  
Airbus defended its subsidies by arguing that U.S. 
commercial aircraft producers also benefited from 
government assistance, though this assistance was more 
indirect. Organizations such as NASA, which is funded by 
taxpayer dollars, support aeronautics and propulsion 
research that is shared with U.S. aircraft manufacturers. 
In addition, research sponsored by the U.S. military yields 
important technological spillovers for the U.S. commercial 
aircraft industry; most notably in aircraft engines and 
aircraft design.  
The battle over the appropriateness of subsidies raged 
for the first twenty-two years of Airbus's existence. The 
first major attempt to put the issue to rest was contained 
in a commercial aviation section written into the Tokyo 
round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
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treaty in 1979. The negotiations leading up to this 
agreement provided the United States with the first 
opportunity formally and unequivocally to put an end to the 
subsidy issue by negotiating for a provision in the treaty 
to ban direct government subsidies. Although U.S. 
negotiators proposed straightforward language that would 
have achieved this end, they did not press the point when 
other signatories objected. Instead, they agreed on 
compromise language that imposed what the U.S. negotiators 
thought were significant limitations on government 
subsidies for civilian aircraft production. Subsidies, 
however, were not expressly forbidden, and interpretations 
of the phraseology in the treaty would be the cause of much 
controversy during the 1980s (McGuire 1997).  
The European governments saw the treaty as a victory 
and continued on their course. The limitations on subsidies 
referred to in the treaty applied to subsidies that would 
have the effect of harming the competitive position of 
industries in other signatories' countries. Since U.S. 
firms dominated the commercial aircraft market, the 
European position was that subsidies to Airbus could not 
possibly cause material harm to the competitive position of 
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U.S. manufacturers and were therefore allowed by the 
treaty.  
By the early 1980s, when the Airbus A300 was winning 
about half the business for wide-bodied jets and U.S. 
exports were suffering because of the strengthening dollar, 
U.S. trade officials renewed their attack on European 
subsidies. Negotiators from the Reagan administration 
accused Airbus of violating trade agreements. The heated 
discussions were laced with charges and countercharges, but 
little progress was made. This situation suited European 
negotiators quite well, since they were essentially buying 
time. From the U.S. perspective, the problem was 
exacerbated by the fact that U.S. manufacturers did not 
support the filing of a formal complaint. Europe was a 
major market for them, and they did not want to be harmed 
by European retaliation.  
In 1992, officials in both the United States and the 
European Union (EU) finally agreed on a bilateral reduction 
in subsidies and signed what has come to be known as the 
"Airbus accord." The principal element of the accord was a 
cap on how large a subsidy the U.S. and European aerospace 
industries could receive for product development. Such 
launch aid was limited to 33 percent of the total 
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development cost of an aircraft, and the loan would have to 
be repaid with interest within seventeen years. In 
addition, the indirect subsidies (spillover benefits from 
military contracts) would be limited to 4 percent of a 
firm's commercial aircraft revenue.  
Since the accord formally legitimized the use of 
subsidies, the agreement can be viewed in many ways as a 
victory for Airbus. The failure of the U.S. aircraft 
industry and the U.S. government to take formal action on 
the subsidies issue during the 1970s and 1980s, on the 
basis of violation of then-existing trade agreements, had 
given Airbus the time it needed to establish itself as a 
force in the marketplace. By 1992, Airbus had achieved its 
goal of capturing 30 percent of new orders. The A320 was 
profitable, and the newly launched A330 and A340 models 
were showing great promise. The accord thus came at a time 
when Airbus was becoming less dependent on subsidies and 
could operate comfortably under the 33 percent cap.  
There seems to be little doubt that Airbus would not 
be in a position of such prominence today without the huge 
direct subsidies that the consortium has received. 
Moreover, U.S. policymakers and aircraft manufacturers 
believed that these subsidies violated trade agreements and 
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gave Airbus an unfair advantage. Why, then, did the United 
States not press the issue more forcefully? There may have 
been several reasons. One is that it may not have realized 
how instrumental the subsidies were going to be in making 
Airbus a viable competitor long-term. Instead, U.S. 
negotiators focused on issues such as government financing 
of export sales, which was a short-term consideration. 
Second, some sectors of the U.S. aircraft industry, such as 
engine manufacturers and airline companies, had a vested 
interest in seeing Airbus succeed, and thus did not support 
taking action against Airbus. Third, U.S. airframe 
manufacturers feared a loss of business in Europe if they 
pressed too vigorously on the subsidies issue. Fourth, at 
critical times during the 1980s the U.S. negotiators lacked 
clear focus and direction, since there was no unified and 
well-defined position in their negotiating stance.  
For a time, it was not clear whether the Commerce 
Department or the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
should take the lead in the negotiations. Finally, the very 
success of U.S. manufacturers served to weaken the U.S. 
negotiating position. Since U.S. manufacturers dominated 
the industry, it would have been difficult to convince 
negotiators from other countries that U.S. manufacturers 
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should receive more protection from competition. 
Furthermore, other countries such as Japan and Brazil may 
have wanted to leave the door open for government support 
of their own aircraft industries in the future, so it is 
unlikely that they would have supported the U.S. position.  
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6 Competing Technologies 
 
Boeing maintains a long practice of technological 
distinction and modernization, by building new versions of 
its line up of commercial airplanes; improving, producing, 
supporting and modifying aircraft for the U.S. military; by 
building launch vehicles capable of hoisting tons into 
orbit; to improving communications for people around the 
world through a sophisticated system of satellites. 
Boeing has been building commercial airliners since 
1927 with the first Boeing commercial jet airliner, the 
7O7, introduced in l955. Accolades to Boeing as the success 
is remarkable when one realizes that the Boeing 
"Design/Build" process has not changed very much during the 
past three decades.  
The importance of the above statement lies in the fact 
that despite the system being antiquated, cumbersome and 
inefficient creating production delays, increased costs and 
spawning a huge bureaucracy simply to handle the paperwork, 
the company managed to achieve its goal. However, Boeing 
must clearly be motivated to bring this World War II era 
process into the 21st Century if it is to compete with 
Airbus.  
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Airbus Industries has quickly provided much 
competition to Boeing.  The important factor is that Airbus 
is provided government subsidies allowing it to operate in 
the red. This advantage is not available to Boeing, thereby 
enabling Airbus to afford to develop new technologies 
without having to worry about passing on the costs to the 
customers. This means that Airbus price their aircraft 
competitively to lure away airlines from Boeing. This is 
the major point of the thesis that demonstrates how the 
management of Airbus worked towards achieving a state of 
the art jet, without incurring huge costs.  
It should be noted that cost cutting effects of the 
changing airline industry resulting from deregulation in 
1978 are still being felt in the commercial aircraft 
industry. The competition among airlines for passengers has 
resulted in a greater emphasis on cost cutting leading to 
mergers and bankruptcies. In addition, airlines modified 
their routing systems since they were not limited to 
certain routes, as was the case before deregulation, 
changing their buying patterns for aircraft accordingly.  
Initially after deregulation, airlines were less 
concerned with having the most technologically advanced 
airplane and more concerned about the affordability of that 
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airplane.  Cost and efficiency were important.  However, 
with the integration of automation, affordability and 
efficiency was able to go hand in hand with the 
implementation of technology.  Over the past several 
decades, safer and more reliable designs have been 
responsible for much of the progress made in reducing the 
accident rate and increasing efficiency.  Improvements in 
engines, systems, and structures have all contributed to 
this achievement.   At the forefront of this rolling change 
was Airbus with its government subsidies to help implement 
new designs.  As automation in the cockpit increased, there 
have been many resulting ideas on how to implement this 
technology.  As with most increases in capabilities such as 
automation, there are advantages and disadvantages.  
Advantages of automation have been increased capacity and 
productivity, relief from routine operations, precise 
handling of routine operations, and economical utilization 
of machines.  The two largest manufacturers of transport 
aircraft, Boeing and Airbus, have two different 
philosophies on the implementation of automation. 
In looking at Boeing’s philosophy, the idea of 
“automation as a tool” comes to mind.  When dealing with 
automation, Boeing has four areas that it considers:  
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Customer input; Appropriate degree of automation; Crew 
interaction capability; and Communication, navigation, and 
surveillance improvements.  Boeing’s cockpits are designed 
to provide automation to assist the aircrew and not to 
replace their responsibility for the safe and efficient 
operation of the aircraft.  According to Boeing and certain 
studies, aircrew errors typically occur when aircrew do not 
perceive or interpret a problem and fail to act 
appropriately in order to prevent the situation from 
escalating.  Hence Boeing’s philosophy is to incorporate 
intuitive, easy-to-use systems, in an attempt to decrease 
the hazards.  These systems support instrument displays 
with visual and tactile motion cues to aid the crew in the 
use of automation and more importantly to minimize 
potential confusion about what functions are automated.  In 
addition, visual and tactile motion cues are provided by 
feedback to the controls in order to reinforce situational 
awareness and help keep the aircrew fully aware of changes 
occurring to the airplane’s status and flight path during 
all phases of automated and manual flight.  This philosophy 
has led to an over reliance on the system even though the 
system was designed only to be a tool.  
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Airbus, on the other hand, has a philosophy that 
mirrors the idea of “automation as a control.”  Airbus uses 
its design of automation as a means of increasing 
efficiency and economy of the aircraft as well as safety 
through out the flight envelope of the aircraft, thereby 
decreasing the risk.  According to Airbus, “within the 
normal flight envelope, automation must not work against 
operator inputs, except when absolutely necessary for 
safety.  This means that it is possible for automation to 
have the final input in the control of the aircraft.  The 
aircrew can be limited by automation.  The challenge with 
this progression is the aircrew’s ability to fully 
comprehend what is going on. If the aircrew cannot 
understand the automation or what the automation is doing 
then they cannot effectively plan ahead or control the 
aircraft during certain tasks.  In looking at these task 
demands, one must also consider unexpected demands on the 
aircrew, which has led to many incidents and mishaps.  
Unlike Boeing, Airbus does not use tactile motion cues.  
Tactile motion cues provide visual and mechanical feedback 
to the aircrew.  The belief is that aircrew should monitor 
instruments as opposed to monitoring the movement of 
controls thereby keeping the pilot mentally engaged.  
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Automation must not reduce the overall reliability of the 
aircraft, which includes the aircrew.  Airbus’ philosophy 
has resulted in excessive mental workload resulting in 
aircrew system operating errors.  
One of the most significant differences between Boeing 
and Airbus is their philosophies on automation. Automation 
has allowed for more efficient crew resource management.  
The findings of the President's Task Force on Crew 
Complement in the early 1980s allowed airplanes to be 
certified for two-person operation, and this crewing was 
adopted as the standard for all new types. In many cases, 
especially for Airbus, a common type rating covered many 
models.  Along with development was the introduction of the 
first "glass cockpit" aircraft in civil service. Their 
primary flight and aircraft systems displays were on 
cathode-ray tubes (CRTs), which motivated the glass cockpit 
description, although all types use some electromechanical 
instruments as well. They have also made extensive use of 
digital microprocessors (the 767 and 757 had over 100).  
During the 1980s, considerable operational experience 
was gained with these third-generation aircraft. As 
manufacturers gained confidence in the new automation 
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technology, it was incorporated and its uses were extended 
in new designs.  
This era saw the development and introduction of the 
Airbus A320 (1989) (the first of the all-glass cockpit 
airplanes), the Boeing 747-400, a greatly advanced two-
person crew version of the venerable 747 in service since 
1970, the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11, a two-person crew DC-10 
variant that entered service in 1991, and the Fokker F-100, 
an enlarged and highly automated outgrowth of the earlier 
F-28 regional jet. 
The early adoption of automation philosophy by Airbus 
has given it a highly competitive advantage against Boeing 
and the competition in automation technology between the 
two competitors has generally been won by Airbus in the 
last few years.  The majority of aircrew are subscribers to 
the Airbus design philosophy that basically attempts to 
prevent an aircraft from getting into a hazardous situation 
where the Boeing design philosophy provides control 
authority to perhaps get you out of a hazardous situation. 
There are several cases that show that computerized control 
over the flight regime can still result in an accident if 
the crew misinterprets the automation or cannot keep up 
with what the automation is doing.  A case in point is the 
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1994 crash of a China Airlines Airbus A310 in Nagoya. A 
counter-point is that Airbus type automation might have 
saved the American Airlines Boeing 757 in Columbia by 
automatically retracting the speedbrakes, which were left 
deployed, during their terrain escape maneuver.  In both of 
the above examples the aircraft functioned as they were 
designed, it was the flight crews that misinterpreted the 
condition of their aircraft. To paraphrase a popular 
advertising slogan used in the aviation business "the best 
safety device in any aircraft is a well trained pilot".  
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7 The Road Ahead 
 
The future changes to the Boeing Commercial Aircraft 
Company must encompass all fields if they are to compete 
with Airbus. From the philosophy of the company to the 
technical details, every aspect of the design/build process 
will need to be modified if Boeing is to compete. Boeing 
has been smarter ever since Airbus snatched the lead in the 
civil jet market by delivering more aircraft for the first 
time. Airbus is still in front this year, with 224 
deliveries to the end of September, compared to Boeing's 
218. The Americans' beef is that Airbus still gets soft 
loans from the governments of Germany, France, Britain and 
Spain. 
Boeing's chief executive, Harry Stonecipher, has been 
itching to have a go at Airbus. He was brought out of 
retirement to run the company after it lost its two top 
executives in a row after improper dealings with the 
Pentagon over defense contracts. Previously, as number two 
at Boeing, he was always pushing for a more aggressive line 
against Airbus subsidies. 
According to Boeing, Airbus can only make such rapid 
moves in the marketplace because it can count on launch 
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aid. Mr. Stonecipher points out that the European company 
has been able to roll out five new products in the past 
decade, while Boeing, with an eye to shareholders and its 
bottom line, has managed one. 
It is true that the big attraction of state-provided 
launch aid is that if a product flops, the money does not 
have to be repaid; so the risk is borne partly by European 
taxpayers. But Airbus now has to continue paying penalties 
long after the loan and interest have been repaid.  
 
The Duopoly Market  
Boeing embarked on an ambitious four-year 
restructuring program in the mid-1990s and had hoped that, 
by adopting “Lean” production techniques and otherwise 
reengineering its production processes, it would be able to 
produce airplanes more rapidly and at 25 percent less cost. 
However, because demand for new aircraft was soaring, and 
Boeing was reluctant to see its market share slip, it 
attempted to gear up production rates to record levels at a 
time when its assembly lines and other processes were still 
being transformed. The company was unprepared and ill 
equipped to handle the additional work, and numerous 
production problems ensued. Antiquated computer systems, 
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parts shortages, inexperienced workers, work being done out 
of proper sequence, and other inefficiencies led to severe 
production bottlenecks.  
The merger with McDonnell Douglas in the late 1990s 
only compounded these problems. The meshing of corporate 
cultures did not go as smoothly as hoped, and power 
struggles in the upper ranks of management detracted from 
the drive to streamline the firm's operations. 
Indecisiveness with regard to how best to use the new 
resources coming into the firm eroded employee morale. 
Moreover, Boeing's assemblers have complained that 
production goals have increasingly come from the top down, 
without proper concern as to whether those goals could be 
achieved. The problems were so great that in the fall of 
1997 Boeing even had to shut down its assembly lines for 
several weeks in an attempt to sort out the chaos.  
Boeing's problems have been exacerbated by the fact 
that for the past several years Boeing and Airbus have 
engaged in vicious price competition, with both firms 
offering discounts of 20 percent or more in order to 
capture or preserve market share. It is ironic that, in the 
midst of one of the greatest boom periods ever for 
commercial aircraft sales, profitability has been elusive 
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for both firms. Boeing's announcement in 1998 that it was 
raising prices 5 percent on most of its models, followed by 
Airbus's announcement of a 3 percent price increase, may be 
a sign that this ruinous price competition, which has been 
a boon for the airlines, may be abating.  
Boeing cut back the production rates of its wide-
bodied, long-range 747 and 777 models in 1999, because of 
both weakness in the Asian market and Boeing's forecast 
that demand for wide-bodied models will be declining during 
the next decade. Boeing has focused instead on expanded 
production of the smaller, less-expensive, shorter-range 
737, to allow Boeing to establish itself in the rapidly 
expanding market for small, regional jetliners. Boeing has 
also begun developing the 787 Dreamliner to compete in 
these markets. 
For its part, Airbus recently completed its own four-
year program of cutting costs and reengineering its 
production lines. Although its production capacity is still 
well below Boeing's, it increased production 30 percent in 
1999, followed by further expansion of production capacity 
over the following years. Airbus has been buoyed recently 
with orders from British Airways and Scandinavian Airlines 
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System (SAS), both of which previously flew only Boeing 
aircraft.  
The creation of the current corporate entity that 
replaced the old Airbus resulted in substantial cost 
savings through elimination of many of the decision-making 
and production inefficiencies inherent in the former 
organization. In addition, a revamped Airbus has been in a 
better position to take in new partners, including American 
firms. The new structure has given Airbus the capability of 
raising capital in financial markets. Airbus now has much 
more flexibility by significantly reducing its dependence 
on government support. The reorganized Airbus is less 
vulnerable to the whims of government officials, and it has 
greater control over the amount and timing of its capital 
infusions. While Airbus works to consolidate and expand its 
market share in existing market segments just as Boeing, it 
has taken a different approach.  It has expanded its fleet 
with the development of the A380.   
 
The Different Vision of the Future 
The Airbus A380 
The Airbus A380 is a double-deck, four-engined 
airliner manufactured by Airbus S.A.S. It first flew on 
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April 27, 2005, from Toulouse in France. Commercial flights 
should begin in late 2006 after 18 months of testing, with 
the delivery of the first aircraft to launch customer 
Singapore Airlines. During much of its development phase, 
the aircraft was known as the Airbus A3XX, and the nickname 
Superjumbo has become associated with the A380. (Norris, 
2006) 
The A380 is double decked, with the upper deck 
extending along the entire length of the fuselage. This 
allows for a spacious cabin with 50% more floor space than 
the next largest airliner, providing seating for 555 people 
in standard three-class configuration or up to 853 people 
in full economy class configuration. Two models of the A380 
are currently available; the A380-800, the passenger model, 
the largest passenger airliner in the world, superseding 
the Boeing 747 and the A380-800F, will be one of the 
largest freight aircraft and will have a payload capacity 
exceeded only by the Antonov An-225. 
The A380-800 has a maximum range of 15,000 kilometers 
(8,000 nm, sufficient to fly from Chicago to Sydney 
nonstop), and a cruising speed of Mach 0.85 (about 900 km/h 
at cruise altitude), similar to that of the Boeing 747. 
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The development of this aircraft, at an estimated cost 
of at least $10 billion, takes Airbus in a direction quite 
the opposite of Boeing's. Boeing recently shelved plans to 
develop its own super-jumbo and pushed development of a 
supersonic aircraft to the back burner as well. Boeing's 
view is that in the future the market will demand smaller 
aircraft flying more frequently to more locations and that 
the 747 will be adequate to handle large-capacity needs. 
 
The Boeing 787 
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a mid-sized wide body, 
twin engined passenger airliner currently under development 
by Boeing and scheduled to enter service in 2008. It will 
carry between 210 and 330 passengers depending on the 
seating configuration, and will be more fuel-efficient than 
comparable earlier airliners. It will also be the first 
major airliner to use composite material for most of its 
construction. 
Prior to January 28, 2005, the 787 was known as the 
developmental designator 7E7. On April 26, 2005, one year 
to the day after the launch of the program, the final look 
of the external 787 design was frozen. With a less rakish 
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nose and a more conventional tail, the final design is 
aerodynamic superior to the initial 7E7 concept. 
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8 Implications for Competition in the New 
Millennium  
 
The rivalry between Boeing and Airbus has many 
implications for the competitive environment in the future. 
First, the growth of the global marketplace will require 
that many firms be larger and leaner. As barriers to 
international trade continue to fall and as firms 
increasingly see the world as their marketplace and 
themselves as transnational, heightened levels of 
competition, with the consequent reduction in pricing 
power, are forcing firms to cut costs and otherwise 
increase efficiency. Recent domestic and cross-border 
mergers between industry giants (Exxon/Mobil and British 
Petroleum/Amoco in the oil industry, Daimler-Benz/Chrysler 
and Ford/Volvo in the automotive industry, 
Travelers/Citicorp and NationsBank/Bank of America in 
financial services, and Rhone-Poulenc/Hoechst and 
Zeneca/Astra in the drug industry) are only a few of the 
recent consolidations in a trend that began early in the 
1990s.  
These larger firms have the potential to achieve 
economies by consolidating information processing, 
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marketing, distribution, and a myriad of other functions, 
and otherwise eliminating duplication of effort at all 
levels of the firm. Higher levels of output also allow for 
greater economies of scale and scope, and larger market 
share brings with it added political and financial clout. 
Firms that had been shielded from competition in the past, 
by protective governments or small market size, are finding 
that survival is now more difficult. The age of more open 
economies and rapidly developing information and 
communication technology is providing the opportunity to 
achieve greater economies of scale and scope with a 
likelihood of larger concentration ratios in many 
industries.  
The effects of these phenomena have been seen clearly 
in the commercial aircraft industry. If Airbus had not been 
created, it is likely that the market structure would still 
be a duopoly, but it would be shared between Boeing and 
McDonnell Douglas. The tremendous barriers to entry, 
substantial economies of scale, and limited demand for the 
product dictate that this industry may be a natural 
duopoly, especially since governments would likely prevent 
the evolution to monopoly.  
  54
Second, government support for commercial enterprises 
will likely diminish in the future. The success of Airbus - 
indeed, its very existence - is attributable primarily to 
the massive direct subsidies it received. An enterprise 
like Airbus likely could not be created in the same way 
today anywhere in the world. The evolution toward a more 
globally competitive private marketplace has been 
accompanied by a trend toward the streamlining and 
downsizing of government as well. Hundreds of billions of 
dollars in privatizations have occurred worldwide during 
the past two decades. In addition, European governments 
have been cutting their budget deficits, primarily by 
slashing spending, in order to achieve or maintain 
compliance with the convergence criteria for monetary 
union. The Japanese government is already saddled with 
rapidly growing debt as it attempts to jumpstart its 
moribund economy, and emerging Asian and Latin American 
nations are pursuing contractionary fiscal policies in 
response to the global financial crisis.  
Bilateral trade agreements, as well as more general 
trade-enhancing agreements adopted through the World Trade 
Organization in recent years, also militate against the 
level of government subsidization received by Airbus. 
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Governments and firms alike will surely be more vigilant 
and more aggressive in the future with regard to the 
possibility that governments elsewhere will attempt to 
create an artificial comparative advantage in a particular 
industry through subsidization, as was the case with 
Airbus.  
Third, heightened competition will force firms to 
respond more quickly to changing conditions. Mostly by 
accident, Airbus discovered its own version of “Lean” 
production simply through the way in which it was 
organized. Various components of each aircraft are built 
throughout Europe and the United States, and then shipped 
to France, where they are pieced together by large 
machines. In the process, a variation of just-in-time 
inventory control is implicitly implemented. Boeing has 
been wedded to more of a mass-production, assembly-line 
process, and as a result the employees-to-aircraft-produced 
ratio is around 220 for Boeing, compared to only 143 for 
Airbus. Boeing was attempting to modernize its 
manufacturing process when it dramatically expanded its 
production three years ago and encountered numerous 
production bottlenecks.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion we can say that it is clear that Boeing 
should have recognized much earlier that its industrial 
model was outmoded and begun to make the necessary changes 
sooner and in a more orderly fashion.  Boeing's failure to 
do so has resulted in its not meeting production deadlines, 
incurring substantial cost overruns, inability to integrate 
new age technology, and selling airplanes at significant 
discounts.  Unfortunately for Boeing, it did not learn from 
what happened to U.S. auto manufacturers in the face of 
intense competition from Japanese producers in the 1980s or 
believed that it was immune to similar competitive 
pressures created by Airbus. Past Market power appears to 
have led to complacency in Boeing's case.  
Increased market power of corporations will require 
governments to be more vigilant in promoting fair 
competition and reducing the amount of subsidies.  Boeing 
needs to press this issue as Airbus can now be considered a 
stand alone entity no longer relying upon government 
subsidies.   
The battle between Airbus and Boeing for market share 
has shown once again just how ruinous unbridled price 
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competition can be, and firms in similar situations in 
other industries may be more circumspect about engaging in 
such a strategy in the future.  
Airbus will continue on its current streak of 
dominance unless Boeing counters the three major aspects 
discussed.  The first item is the economical debate over 
subsidies.  The playing field needs to be level for Boeing 
to succeed.  Boeing needs to be more aggressive in seeking 
a common playing field.  Without another company to disrupt 
the polarization created by Airbus and Boeing their 
competition will be looked upon as that between the 
European Union and the United States and their policies on 
the future of air travel.   
The next aspect of the competition is technology.  The 
past decades have seen an increase in the use of automation 
in the cockpit.  Boeing and Airbus have taken two different 
approaches on the integration of automation in the cockpit.  
Boeing needs to take advantage of the new technologies that 
are present now and update its cockpits.  One advantage of 
Airbus is that all of their cockpits have the same layout, 
thus making transitions from one type of aircraft to 
another easier.    Boeing needs to continue updating its 
cockpits and offer airlines the possibility of common type 
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ratings in similar Boeing aircraft much like 737 series.  
The design of the cockpit of the Boeing 777 was a step in 
the right direction.  The Boeing 787 must continue in that 
path.   
The final aspect is the different visions of the 
future.  The future of commercial aviation is plagued by 
multiple problems.  Among these problems are crowded skies, 
increases in fuel prices, and increases in the number of 
travelers.  Airbus’ and Boeing’s different vision of the 
future has produced two different types of aircraft.  Each 
believes its product will be the answer to the problems 
faced by commercial aviation.  Airbus thinks airlines will 
need bigger airplanes to handle more traffic; Boeing 
expects airlines to accommodate growth by flying more 
routes with slightly smaller airplanes.  Although not an 
aggressive leap forward in technology, Boeing needs to sway 
the market towards the more efficient 787, especially 
during this time of increased fuel prices and increased 
commuter type travel.    The future will show if Boeing’s 
vision will put Boeing back in front of Airbus as the 
“World’s leading commercial airline manufacturer.” 
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